期刊论文

Interlock Directorates and Merger Performance: The Evidence from Chinese A Share Listed Companies

中文

南开管理评论

Nankai Business Review

1008-3448

2013

16

6

112-122

国家自然科学基金项目(71372163);国家自然基金青年项目(71302195)

本校为其他机构

本文以社会镶嵌理论为基础,选择2000-2011年并购公司和目标公司均是我国沪深两市A股上市公司的并购事件为样本,主要探索并购双方的连锁董事关系是否会影响并购绩效.研究发现,并购双方的连锁董事关系会减损并购公司、目标公司以及将二者作为一个整体考虑的并购后实体的并购绩效.进一步研究发现,当并购公司的公司治理质量较高时,这种减损作用会降低.当并购双方存在连锁董事关系时,目标公司更易接受股票作为并购支付方式.本文的研究成果对于解释我国证券市场的“并购损益之谜”提供了有益的启示.

Based on theory of social embeddedness, firms＇ econom- ic behavior and outcome are embedded in their social connection structures. Interlock directorate is an important component of firms＇ social connections, and director networks can affect firms＇ decision-making process or firm value in complex ways. Scholars explore the influence of interlock directorates on firms＇ economic behavior and outcome from various perspectives, such as firm strat- egy, managerial incentive, firm performance etc. However, previ- ous research is mainly concerned ...